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ABSTRACT
The paper considers the analytical underpinnings of the scope for
and limits of demand and supply management. After restating a general
policy effectiveness result for New—Classical macroeconomic models,
several non-Wairasan equilibrium models are considered. These use the
efficiency wage hypothesis to generate equilibrium unemployment in the
labor market and imperfect competition in the goods market to generate
scope for demand management. Hysteresis models of the natural rate are
also reviewed briefly. Tentative implications are drawn for the con-
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1. Introduction
The title of this paper was chosen for me, not y me. Its ring of
openmindedness, evenhandedness and balance all but compells an author to
parade as a man of' the extreme centre, a fanatical moderate in analysis and
policy prescription. I identify with such a characterization only
reluctantly.
My uneasiness with the title of this paper is, however, due to
something more fundamental than an innate inability to try and please both
sides of an argument. The usefulness of the very concepts of "demandside"
and "supply-side" should be questioned for a number of reasons.
First,even where in individual markets demand and supply can be
distinguished conceptually (i.e. in traditional competitive analysis), the
uses of these conceptsare at times confused and confusing. The demand for
labor is part of the aggregate supply side. The supply of credit is part of
aggregate demand. However, in working capital models of production (or in
any model involving input-output lags) interest rates and/or the
availability of credit affect aggregate supply (see e.g. Blinder [1987]). In
any model with endogenous capital formation, financial market conditions
-affectaggregate supply in the long run.
Second, every non-trivial policy action (monetary, fiscal, financial,
regulatory, incomes-policy etc.) influences both aggregate demand and
aggregate supply (whenever these concepts are well-defined). We therefore
cannot speak of demand policies and supply policies but only of the demand
effects and the supply effects of given policies, which will always have
both kinds of effects.
Third, and most fundamently, modern theoretical developments which are
only just entering the stage of being the subject of' systematic econometric
testing, suggest that demand and supply may not even conceptually be
separated. The best-known of these developments are those concerning the
efficiency wage and those related to hysteresis or path-dependence.
While I believe it to be important and even essential for progress in
our understanding of how mature industrial economies work and how to improve
their performance, to escape from the clutches of an intellectually moribund
conventional competitive analysis,' I cannot offer an integrated, coherent
alternative "Weltanschauung". I shall however list a few of' the many—3—
promising developments that may become the bricks and mortar of the economics
of the 21st century. Enough has been achieved already to suggest the need for
major changes in our view of how modern mixed economies work and in our
appreciation of the scope for and limits to what policy can achieve.
If the demand—side vs. supply—side dichotomy is no longer very
useful, the distinction between stabilization policy and structural or
allocative policy may still have some limited taxonomic usefulness.
Stabilization policy aims to influence (and, one hopes, to minimize)
deviations of the actual equilibrium (in general a non—Wairasian and possibly
quantity—constrained, rationing equilibrium), which will in general not be
(constrained) Pareto—efficient, from the (or a) (constrained) Pareto—efficient
equilibrium. In the context of the aggregate labor market, stabilization
policy aims at deviations of actual employment from full employment or from a
(presumed stabilization policy—invariant) "natural" level of employment. As
regards aggregate output, stabilization policy is concerned with the gap
between actual output and its full employment capacity value or some other
appropriate notion of the "natural" level of output. Sometimes stabilization
policy is defined more broadly to include the stability of the internal and
external values of the currency and the achievement of "sustainable" financial
deficits and surpluses for the public and private sectors (and by implication
for the external sector).
Structural or allocative policy aims to influence the nature of
(constrained) Pareto—efficient equilibria in labor, product and financial
markets. In the labor market, such policies aim to influence the (presumed
stabilization policy—invariant) natural rate of unemployment. In the aggregate
product market it seeks to modify the capacity or full—employment level of
output.
The dichotomy is not neat but can be helpful in focussing policy
debate. It is again true, however, that any non—trivial monetary, financial,
fiscal, regulatory, etc. policy action will almost always have both allocative
and stabilization consequences (see Buiter [1984]).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I review the role
of stabilization policy in New Classical Macroeconomic models. I reproduce a
result of Marini [1985] that in all New Classical models which have a) signal
extraction and b) a non—predetermined intertemporal speculation term-4-
(somewhere in the model), monetary policy (and by direct extension fiscal
policy) is very effective as a stabilization instrument in the sense that it
can eliminate entirely the gap between actual and "full information" output
or employment even when the policy authority is no better (or even less)
informed than the private sector.
In section 3 the efficiency wage hypothesis and the hysteresis or path-
dependence hypothesis are shown to blur or eliminate entirely the
distinction between demand-side and supply-side. The far-reaching
implications for policy are sketched briefly. Section 4 sums up and touches
briefly on some other important policy issues that could not be addressed in
the body of the paper for reasons of space. It also contains some forthright
policy recommendations aimed at challenging prevalent Euro-pessimist
complacency.
2. The role of' stabilization policy in New Classical Macroeconomic models
New Classical macroeconomic models are sequential competitive
equilibrium models where market participants have symmetric information and
(Muth)-rational expectations. This discussion relates only to the monetary
variant of the New Classical School, associated with the names of Lucas,
Sargent and Wallace and Barro. It ignores the real business cycle models
developed by Kydland and Prescott [1982], Long and Plosser [1983] and
others.
Since markets clear continuously, with equilibrium prices determined by
the equality of competitive supply and demand, stabilization policy in New
Classical models has a much more restricted meaning than in Keynesian or
Neo-Keynesian models.
Because of incomplete (albeit symmetric) information, markets may clear
at the "wrong" prices and quantities: actual prices and quantities may
differ from what they would be under full current or contemporaneous
information. Policy rules might therefore influence (and indeed eliminate)
the gap between the actual competitive equilibrium and the "full
information" competitive equilibrium.
On reading recent contributions to this literature, the conclusion is
inescapable that Marinis [1985] powerful and general result about policy
effectiveness in New Classical macromodels has not yet permeated a large-5-
part of the professional economic awareness. I shall therefore reproduce it
very briefly, using Marinis example of Barros well-known [1976] model.
Leaving out some unimportant intercept terms, Barros model is given in
equations (1)-(7). Equation (8) is a generalization of his policy rule. The
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contains the model [equations (1) -(8)], laggedvalues of all
exogenous and endogenous aggregate variables fP_1, t—2 •••Mt_i,
Mt_2, ...;v_1,v_2, ...;m1,m_2, ...}andPt(z), the local price.
It does not contain £t(z),
mt, Mt or P. Vtisthe aggregate real shock,
c(z) the local real shock and the monetary shock. Note that the
policy feedback rule contains past (white noise)monetary shocks,
The past shocks are all white noise and are in the informationset
of the private sector.
The actual solution values P (z), and twillin general be t * * *
different from the full information solution values P(z), P and y •These
t t t arethe solution values that would prevail if therewere full contemporaneous
information; i.e. with information set =(z)U {m, Mt, c(z), t•
Using e.g. the method of undetermined coefficients, it iseasily
checked that the difference between the actualintertemporal substitution









Ii1(a [E(AMt+i ./Qt(z) —E(&Mti./Q)]-7-
thereforedepends on the "inference errors" concerning the
currentmonetary shock (mt -E(m/Qt(z)))andthecurrent aggregate
shock(Vt -E(vt/Qt(z))),
and on the differences between current
estimates of future monetary growth based on actual information and
estimates based on full current information:
E(AMt+i+/Qt(z)) —E(AMt+i+/Qt)
i =1,2
Note that, through some idiosyncrasy of the (ad-hoc) model, only
monetary growth estimates for periods t+2 arid beyond (i.e. not for
period t+1) matter. This is the source of Barros erroneous
generalization (Barro [1976, p. 20]) from his policy rule AM =m
+
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The d1÷1 and are policy choice parameters. Clearly we can set
D =0by choosing any values of ó. and 7.such that t . 1+1 i+1
i—i a — —
1+.1(") c5. =0and 1 +.Z(') 7. =0. i=1a i+1 i=1a i+1
With
Dt0, it follows immediately that actual output y is also equal
to full information output y. Three points should be noted.
First, Barro's rule =m
+1v1 isindeed ineffective. While he
deserves credit for having found the only lagged feedback rule to yield
ineffectiveness, that result clearly lacks any generality. Feeding back in a
deterministic manner (i.e. with known 6i+1 and from aggregate
information arbitrarily far in the past, monetary policy can eliminate the
gap between actual and full information output.
Second, this perfect stabilization can be achieved even when the
monetary authorities have an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the
private sector, in the sense that the authorities could use, in period t,
only information older than the most recent information available to the-8-
private sector. E.g. with AMt =m +1375V_375 + 6375 m_375. the
a373
authorities can achieve Dt = 0, provided 1 +(') = 1 +
_0373 a
=0. This contradicts e.g. King [1983].
Third, it doesnt matter if the monetary authority randomizes its
policy (ci ) 0), as long as it responds appropriately to one or morepast
monetary shocks (through the 6.) so as to undo the effects of its own
unpredictability!
Intuitively, what makesforeffectiveness, is that the lagged feedback
rules act like contingent forward contracts by the policyauthority, which
complete the incomplete set of contingent private markets implicit in this
model. Private agents at time t are (implicitly) prevented frommaking
future actions contingent on the future revelation of the asyet unknown
realizations of m andv. The policy maker, through its lagged rule, can do
this, because the presence of a non-predetermined intertemporal)
substitution term means that current endogenous variables are functions of
current expectations of all future values of the policy instrument(s).
Through the lagged feedback rule, these future instrument values can be made
functions of the (currently unknown) current realizations of theexogenous
-variables.By adopting such a rule and, with rational expectations, by being
known tobe doing so, the policy maker canchangethe information content of
the currently observed local price and indeed make itfullyrevealing. In
thead-hoc models of Barro [1976, 1980, 1981] and others, the reason for
this asymmetry in private and public opportunity sets isnt clear. In
optimizing models, a finite-horizon OLG structure might explain the
asymmetry (e.g. Lucas [1972]).
It is easily checked (but left as an exercise for the reader) that
policy effectiveness remains if we replace the intertemporal substitution
term in the supply and demand functions (1) and (2) by a real interest rate
term such as i + (P(z) -E(Pti/Q(z))where i is the nominal interest
rate. (We must of course ensure that if i belongs to Q(z), say because it
is set in an economy-wide capital market, a signal extraction problem
remains. This will require adding an other independent source of noise to
the system). Replacing the interteniporal substitution term in the supply
function by a "surprise" term such as P(z) -E(P/Qt(z))also does not
affect Marinjs policy effectiveness result. Only if there is no signal-9.-
extraction problem, i.e. either because Pt is known or because there is no
current (period t) information in Qt(z) ,willthere be policy
ineffectiveness. Sargent andWallace[1975] fall in this category with a




= - E(P1- + u (IS)
Mt_Pt=_Ait+kyt+u
(12.1)
u, u and u are white noise. contains the model and aggregate
information dated period t-1 and earlier. The intertemporal substitution term
is predetermined and there is no policy effectiveness. Policy effectiveness
is restored if, as in Sargent [19731 the term E((Pt+i—Pt)/Q) in the IS curve
is replaced by E((Pt+i—Pt)/2). .Thismakes the intertemporal substitution
term non—predetermined. Marini's result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition
Signal extraction +(non—predetermined)intertemporal substitution
(somewhere in the model)
>policyeffectiveness.
Marini's result about stabilization policy effectiveness in New
Classical Macromodels is important from the perspective of the intellectual
developments in our discipline. It corrected a pervasive logical error in a
wide range of policy analyses. I do not consider it equally important for
practical policy design, because the object of New Classical stabilization
policy (the gap between symmetric actual and full—information equilibria) is,
practically, a side—show. If markets do indeed clear in traditional
competitive fashion, stabilisation policy based on signal extraction
problems is a second—order affair. With efficient competitive markets
(conditional on the symmetric information held by the private agents), the
gains in welfare to be gained by informing private agents more promptly of the
current value of the aggregate money stock (or by pursuing feedback policies-10-
that have the same effect) are bound to be trivial. Thisliteraturealso has
the information problem exactly backwards: private agents are assumedto
know (or to act as if they know)thetrue structure of the model (the values
of all the parameters of the model, the behavioral parameters of the
government included) but to be badly informed about the current realization
of the money stock. In practice the money stock can be knownveryquickly
and at very little cost, while neither the private agents nor thepolicy
authorities have much of a clue about the true structure of the model.
To have non-trivial scope for stabilization policy, the actual
equilibrium must be a non-Wairasian one. Marinis policy effectiveness
result has very little to do therefore, with Keynesian or Neo-Keynesian
stabilization policy concerns, which are motivated (even if only informally)
by non-Wairasian equilibria.
One point of practical importance brought out by Marinis analysis is
the distinction between asymmetries in information sets between the public
and the private sectors and asymmetries in opportunity sets, as a source of
policyeffectiveness.Even with equal or inferior public sector information,
policy effectiveness will emerge because there are things the authorities
can and will do that the private sector either cannot do or chooses not to
do. The power to tax and to regulate, the monopoly of legal tender and the
longevity of the institutions of government (even if not of individual
administrations) are some of the obvious "deep" sources of such asymmetries
between public and private opportunity sets.
Finally, as shown by Marini [1985], it is easily checked for Barros
model and similar ones, that the feedback rules that influence (and possibly
eliminate) the gap between the actual and the full information equilibrium
also affect the full information equilibrium itself." Stabilization policy
and structural or allocative policy in this model are inextricably
intertwined.
3.Thedependence of demand on supply (and vice-versa): efficiency wages and
hysteresis
To conduct ones analysis and to specify ones policy recommendations
in terms of demand and supply betrays old-fashioned competitive thinking.
The crucial issue is whether this represents a robust, felicitous shortcut—11—
ora misleading or indeed dangerous focus on a rather uninteresting special
case.
It may no longer be correct that the way to make a good economist is to
teach a parrot the two words "supply" and "demand". This possibility is
apparent even in conventional non-competitive analysis where we teach our
first-year students that there is no monopolists supply schedule. Recent
developments have undermined the primacy of the law of supply and demand
from at least two different perspectives. The efficiency wage hypothesis
with its new asymmetric information microfoundations destroys the
conventional distinction between demand and supply even in competitive
markets. It has implications for labor markets, insurance markets, credit
markets andheterogeneousproduct markets in general. The "hysteresis" or
"path-dependence"hypothesis, based on human capital or insider-outsider
micro-foundations suggests that todays actual unemployment rate may be
tomorrows "natural" unemployment rate. It destroysthe distinction between
aggregate demand and aggregatesupply outside the very short run.
Inow turn to these two developments in turn.
the law 2f_dm!n4 andsupply.
Inaconventional competitive market, equilibrium price and quantity
are determined by the intersection of competitive demand and supply
schedules derived from the utility maximizing behavior of price-taking
households and the profit maximizing behavior of price-taking firms. Both
parties to a transaction have identical (symmetric) information.
In order not to be unnecessarily awkward, it will be assumed in what
follows that the (uncompensated) competitive demand schedule is downward-
sloping, that the competitive supply schedule is upward-sloping and that a
unique equilibrium exists.
Consider e.g. the familiair competitive aggregate labor market. The
representative firm, i, maximizes profits
(10) it.= PY.—W(1+r)L. 1 1 P1-12-
Pis the parametric price of output, W the parametric money wage paid
to workers, r the proportional payroll tax rate, output (and sales)
of firm i and L. the employment of homogeneous labor by firm 1. The
production function is given by
(11) Y. =f(QL.) f >0, <0, Q >0.
Q is the quality, efficiency or productivity of labor, assumed to be
exogenous to the firm.
Taking p. W, r andQas given, the firm optimally chooses its level of
employment L1 according to
(12) Qf'(QL) =
Competitivesupply of homogeneous labor is assumed to be an
increasing function of the after-tax real wage, w(l-w), where tis
-w theproportional labor income tax rate and w =
S - (13)L. =s(w(l—t))s > 0.
Competitiveequilibrium prevails when
(14) L = = L
Policy analysis in this simple static model is the comparative
static analysis of the effects of changes in the two tax rates on the
equilibrium real wage and level of employment. This amounts to
determining the "reduced form multipliers", i.e. the partial
derivatives of equations (15) and (16) below, which are obtained by
solving equations (12), (13) and (14) for w and L.
(15) w =h(Q;r, t) hQ > 0; h < 0; h> 0
p w
(16) L =j(Q;r,r) >0; j<0; j<0.
p w-13—
Thiscomparative static analysis can always, and often in an
illuminating way, be decomposed in terms of the shifts in the demand
schedule and/or the supply schedule, drawn in w-L space, as one or more
parameters change. Figure 1 shows as an example the effect of a higher






This analysis can be fancied up considerably, e.g. by introducing
labor adjustment costs, many factors of production and rational
expectations. Comparative statics become comparative dynamics. The
actual and anticipated nature of the policy changes becomes important.
(when were changes first anticipated? How permanent, transitory or
reversible are they perceived to be? How confidently are these
expectations held etc.?), but this is not important for our purposes.
What mattershere is that demand functions anddemand shocks are
conceptuallyand(subject to the standard identification caveats) also
operationally distinct from supply functions and supply shocks. The
intersection of the two schedules determines the Wairasian,
competitive, market-clearing price and quantity.
This picture changes dramatically when efficiency-wage
considerations are permitted. In the context of our simple example this
means that labor is no longer viewed as homogeneous. Different workers
have different levels of productivity or efficiency, but employers
cannot (perfectly) discriminate between workers of different qualities.
The average quality (or efficiency level) of the workforce is, however,-14—
anincreasing function of the real wage (other versions make it an
increasing function of the firm's wage relative to the wage of its
competitors). The literature suggest a whole range of possible
mechanisms for this positive dependence of Q on w (for recent surveys
see Katz [1986] and Stiglitz [1987]). Most of those that are relevant
to a mature industrial economy rely on asymmetric information between
workers and employers and resulting adverse selection or moral hazard
problems. In the adverse selection model of Weiss [1980) e.g. employers
do not know the quality of the individual worker and a Worker's
reservation wage is an increasing function of her quality (a more
efficient worker is also better at painting her home). In other models
with imperfect monitoring of workers by employers and consequent
incentives to shirk, a higher wage increases the worker's opportunity
cost of being found shirking. Other models rely on labor turnover costs
or on morale effects.
For the efficiency wage hypothesis to bite, Q should be an
increasing function of w and there should be initially a region of
"increasing returns" in which a higher wage induces a more than
proportionate increase in labor quality. n denotes the elasticity of
quality with respect to the real wage, i.e. n }'--- Forsimplicity
I assumethat for any givenvalue of the parameter vector e, which
containsallexogenous factors and policy instruments affecting the
price-quality relationship, there exists a unique w1(e) such that for




0; n(w.e) 1 <=>ww1
Itis easy to generate reasonable models with this property (see e.g.
Stiglitz [1987] and the references contained therein).
The representative firm now maximizes (10) with respect to L. and
W, subject to both (11) arid (17). For the moment the "availability
constraint", i.e. the ability of the firm to obtain the labor it-15-





w.is called the efficiency wage. It minimizes the cost of employing an
effective (quality-adjusted) unit of labor w./Q. The quantity of labor
demanded Ld. is solved for from
(19) Q(.(8), e) f-(Q(.(e), e) L) =
Theavailability constraint for the firm (often called the
individual rationality constraint) is that V. the utility of the
representative worker selling to the firm an amount of labor L of
quality Q at a wage w1 should be at least as high as the utility
obtainable in the next best alternative use V, i.e.
(20) V(w.,. L., Q(w,e), 8) > v*(e.)
e and eare vectors of parameters. Reasonable restrictions on V
would be Vw > 0, VL < 0 VQ < 0. When (20) holds with equality we can
solve for the labor supply schedule
(21) L =s(w.,Q(w,e), 0, V*(0)); S > 0; s < 0 < 0
Note that it is possible (though not necessary) that at the
efficiency wage w =w(e),L < L. The firms optimizing demand for
labor can be met without the constraint (20) being binding. If at the
efficiency wage there is excess supply of labor, there is no
"disequilibrium" downward pressure on wages. Labor costs per efficiency
unit of labor are minimized at a real wage in excess of the marktet-
clearing wage. Note also that the demand function and the quantity of
labor demanded by the firm L are crucially dependent on supply— 16—
parameters.Q is part of the "supply side" of the labor market. We can see
this clearly by considering the case where 9 contains the wage income tax
rate, i.e. by assuming, in the spirit of the model of Weiss [1980], that
average quality depends on the after—tax wage Q =Q(w(l—t)).In that case
the efficiency wage increases and the quantity of labor demanded decreases as
the tax on labor income increases. A supply—side parameter shifts labor
demand! The old language clearly is less than helpful here.
The possibility (not the inevitability) of quantity—constrained,
rationing equilibra and other non—Wairasian equilibria is complemented by
comparative statics that may be very different from those of traditional
symmetric information competitive analysis. Apart from explaining real wage
rigidity in the face of persistent (equilibrium!) excess supply, these models
can generate, in rationing equilibra, quantity responses with multiplier
properties in response to exogenous shocks, with little or no (or even
perverse) adjustment in the real wage.
It can similarly explain persistent excess demand in credit markets
and the "non—Wairasian" response of credit and interest rates to changes in
monetary and fiscal policy. It cannot, however, motivate any form of nominal
rigidity in wages, prices or interest rates. "Rigid" real wages and real
interest rates can be equilibrium outcomes in the efficiency wage universe.
Nominal inertia of any kind still awaits another explanation.
When the efficiency wage model of the labor market is combined with
imperfect competition in the product market, the scope for demand management
becomes more transparent. I first summarize an interesting model of Akerlof
and Yellen [1985]. Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1985] and Ball and Romer [1987]
are in the same spirit as Akerlof and Yellen. They rationalize nominal
inertia through the rather arbitrary device of assigning a lumpy cost to
nominal price adjustment. The availability constraint is assumed non-
binding. Let there be N >1firms selling similar but non—identical
products. Each firm i faces the following demand curve for its product:
(22) = c >1 5— 17
Y is aggregate demand and P the general price level, defined as the





Each firm has the identical production function =
andmaximizes profits t.= P.Y.—W.L.by optimally choosing Wj and









Equation(24) reproduces the fixed efficiency wage.
In a symmetric equilibrium, P1 =Pand =Wfor all i. The real




L" is the aggregate supply of (physical) units of labor, assumed to
be independent of the real wage for simplicity.— 18—
Akerlof—Yellen"near—rationality"
As in Akerlof and Yellen [1985], aggregate demand is given by the
constant velocity quantity equation (27), the production function is
Cobb—Douglas as in (28) and Q takes the form given in (29).
(27)
(28) Y =(QL) 0<<1
(29) Q(w.) =—a+bw o<y<1;a>o; b>o
It follows that, for an initial money stock M0, the general price
level P is given by:
(30) Po =kMo
(31) k =[:(c-1)Q(w)
is the initial (real) efficiency wage.
Equations (26)—(31) characterize a full, long—run, optimizing
equilibrium in which all firms are Bertrand maximizers. Assume that, at this
long—run equilibrium, a perturbation in the form of an increase in the nominal
money stock from M to M(1+v) leads to a short—run optimizing response by
only a fraction 1—8 of the total number of firms. The remaining fraction of
firms 8, keeps its money wage and nominal output price unchanged. For small
shocks, this suboptimal behavior is near—rational, in the sense that the
profit loss resulting from the suboptimal behavior is an order of magnitude
smaller than the shock. The reason for the second-order nature of the profit
loss is that the imperfectly competitive firm's profit function is
differentiable in its two controls: own price and own wage. As regards own
price, this follows immediately from the monopolistically competitive Betrand
behavior. As regards own wage, the efficiency wage hypothesis does the
work. In other words, at a full, long—run equilibrium, a failure optimally to
adjust the own price and wage has no first—order effect on profits because the
envelope theorem strikes for the individual firm. When the initial— 19—
equilibriumis one with unemployment, however, the effect of the nominal money
shock on real demand and employment has the same order of magnitude as the
shock.
Let the superscript n denote variables pertaining to near—maximizing
firms and the superscript m variables pertaining to maximizing firms. It







(33) A =(1—a)1[$((1'1+1)+ (1—B)(1—ct)a1] ; O<x￿1
The near—maximizing firms increase their demand for labor because the
relative price of their output has declined and because real money balances
have increased. Their reduction in profits as a result of their failure to
optimize fully in response to the shock is simply the difference between the
profit of a fully optimizing firm 11m and that of a near—optimizing firm 1I'.





The response of aggregate employment is given by:
d(N/No) = (1—(1—8)x)+ dv a
v=o— 20—
Onlywhen B =o (which implies X1) is the employment effect
zero. For For 8>o there is a first—order employment effect.
A kinked demand curve
With the demand function (22), the price elasticityc is
independent of aggregate demand. In general, however, the price elasticity
will depend both on Y and on PjIP, i.e.
(36) =(Y,P./P)
In a fully optimizing symmetric equilibrium, Pj =Pand real
aggregate demand will have a positive (negative) effect on the employment of
an individual firm if is positive (negative). Note however, that since
aggregate demand, Y, must equal aggregate supply, the equilibrium conditions
will still generate unique equilibrium values for L and Y as long as there is
a unique value of s for any given Y (and for any given P1/P). This is obvious
from equations (37) and (38) below.
(37) Q(w)f'(Q(w)) (1 —(y,l))
=W
(38) Y =Nf(Q(w))
An interesting model that permits one to escape from this box
(effectively by making equation (37) non—binding for a range of Y values) is
the piecewise—linear kinked demand curve given in (39) and shown in Figure 2.
(39) =mm Y —ac —1),Y —$(— —1)) ci>8>o
The greater responsiveness of sales to increases in P1 relative to P
compared to decreases can be rationalized using search—theoretic "shopping
models". An increase in P1 relative to P discourages potential new customers
that visit the firm in the same way that a decrease Pt—P attracts potential






toleave in order to search for a lower price elsewhere. A reduction in
does not have a corresponding sales—boosting effect on the firm's current
customers.
In Figure 2, an increase in real aggregate demand shifts the demand
schedule from DKD to D'K'D'. The firm's marginal cost curve is given by
MC(-2, Yi) =— Q•)fQ(w)L)whereL1 is, given Q,anincreasing
function of Yj through the production function given in (11) or (28). Figure
2 shows the case where the upward—sloping marginal cost—curve MC intersects
the marginal revenue correspondences MR and MR' of both demand curves in their
vertical segments. A higher level of real aggregate demand in this case
generates a higher level of supply and employment. Each firm sets P1P (even
before the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium is imposed). "At the kink",
d 1
output demanded and supplied is therefore given by Y1 Y =Y.
The real wage, output and employment are therefore given as functions




Asymmetric equilibrium exists in this model for real demand values
in the range Y is the level of real demand for which marginal cost
1 Y I, •,,
—
(MC)equals —— — + 1,the lowest value of marginal revenue at the kink.Y
the level of real demand for which MC equals ——+1, the highest value of
marginal revenue "at the kink." Note that at the kink, MC(Y.) =MC().
Y can be below the level of output corresponding to full employment of the
labor force.
An ad—hoc model of real demand and nominal prices
Can the authorities influence real aggregate demand and if so, can
they do this systematically or only through policy surprises? Consider the
following standard ad-hoc model of aggregate demand and of the determination
of nominal prices and wages. H is the nominal money stock, B the stock of— 22—
governmentbonds, C exhaustive public spending, T taxes net of transfers. The
aggregate demand schedule is given in equation (40). Two alternative nominal
wage—price blocks are given. The first, represented in equations (42), (45),
and (46) has a sticky general price level and a flexible money wage. The
second, represented in equations (43), (44), (45) and (46) has a sticky money
wage and a flexible general price level. Following McCallum (1980) P is the
general price level that would prevail at full employment, W the money wage
that would prevail at full employment and w* is the labor market—clearing real
wage.









wherep is defined by:
(4) y*y(G, Tt, 4'4)
PtPt
(46) =f(Q(w*)L*)— 23—
Withthe addition of the government budget identity given in (47),
where i is the nominal interest rate, we now have a sample of a wider class of




The scope for demand management to influence Y is transitory in these
models unless there is complete nominal rigidity, i.e. 6 =oin the version
with equation (42) or 6'o in the version with equations (43) and (44). I
consider an exogenously given money wage or nominal price level to be quite
acceptable in a model such as this. There seems to be no good reason for the
money wage (nominal price level) to be driven towards the full employment
equilibrium money wage (nominal price level) when that full employment
equilibrium need never be reached. The further analysis of the determination
of the exogenous nominal anchor by history, convention, habit or accident is
beyond the scope of this paper. What matters for our purposes is that there
are no obvious disequilibrium forces within the model, no perceived free
lunches, that will tend to move the nominal anchor from any arbitrarily
assigned value.— 24—
Thismodel and many like it suggest that aggregate demand expansion
can expand employment without the need for a reduction in real wages (or more
generally in real marginal labor costs). The conventional competitive model
rules out this possibility. If, as I believe, the imperfect competition—
efficiency wage model is a better parable for Europe today than the
conventional competitive parable or other real wage—constrained employment
parables, the case against a demand stimulus is weakened considerably. The
authorities must of course be able to influence real aggregate demand. In a
monetary model, this ability hinges on the behavior of money wages and prices,
something about which the real efficiency wage—imperfect competition model has
nothing to say.
Hysteresis and the footloose NAIRU
Hysteresis is a property of dynamic systems. If it is present, the
steady—state or long—run equilibrium position of the system will not be a
function only of the long—run values of the exogenous variables but also of
the initial condition of the state variables and of the values assumed by the
exogenous variables outside the steady state. Hysteretic or path—dependent
systems are therefore "historical" systems: how you get there determines
where you get to. In discrete time linear systems hysteresis is present when
there are one or more unit roots in the characteristic equation of the state
matrix.
Hysteresis in the natural rate of unemployment is present when
today's natural rate of unemployment is a function of past actual unemployment
rates. Consider e.g. the simple first—order partial adjustment mechanism used
in Buiter and Gersovitz [19811,Hargreaves—Heap[19801 and Buiter and Miller
[1985]. u is the actual unemployment rate. u* the natural rate;
(48) =au1
+(l—c)ui
0 <￿ 1; 0 <u<1
Equation (48) specifies the natural rate as moving average of past
actual unemployment rates with geometrically declining weights, since— 25—
(49) u =(1—a)i0 a U_j_j
Theidea of hysteresis in the natural rate is not a new one (see e.g.
Phelps [1972] and Tobin [1980]). The two most popular economic mechanisms for
generating hysteresis are the "human capital" hypothesis and the "insider—
outsider" hypothesis. According to the human capital hypothesis the
experience of unemployment destroys the human capital of the unemployed by
having a negative effect both on their attitudes towards working (the "culture
of unemployment and dependence" etc.) and on their aptitudes (skills,
knowledge etc.) for work.
The effective labor supply respresented by a given number of
unemployed workers therefore declines over time with the duration of the
unemployment spell. Empirical evidence that the long—term unemployed do not
have any explanatory power in Phillips—curve type equations when the shorter—
term unemployed are also included as an argument (see e.g. Layard and Nickell
[1986] is consistent with this view. Insider—outsider theory (see e.g.
Gregory [1982, 1983, 1986], Lindbeck and Snower [1984, 1986, 1987], Solow
[1985] and Blanchard and Summers [1986]) attributes very different influences
on the firm's wage bargain to those currently employed (the 'insiders') and to
the unemployed, both previous employees of the firm and new job candidates
(the 'outsiders'). In the limit, the unemployed are disenfranchised
completely and the wage bargain is conducted solely in the interests of the
firm and those currently employed. A range of explanations of varying degrees
of plausibility is offered for the inability of the outsiders to undercut the
insiders either by offering to work for less than the insiders in the existing
firm or by seeking employment in new firms that might be able to undercut the
insider—controlled firm. In this model too, the unemployed are, gradually or
immediately, effectively excluded from the bargaining process in the labor
market.
As it stands, equation (48) is clearly too strong. The notion that
the natural rate can be anywhere between zero and one hundred percent is most
implausible. The concept of local hysteresis, as opposed to the local
hysteresis of equation (48), would be much more acceptable.— 26—
Thekinked demand curve model just analyzed has such local hysteresis
properties.
Equation (48) suggests that by keeping u at any given level for long
enough, the natural rate u can be made to approach that level and reach it
(assymptotically). Physical capital formation theories of prolongued and
persistent unemployment don't quite generate that very strong property (see
e.g. Modigliani et al. (1986]). These theories suggest that the kinds of
shocks that produce unemployment also produce low physical capital formation.
Either because of real wage rigidity and real wage—constrained employment or
because of strong physical complementarity and limited substitutality between
physical capital and labor (fixed coefficients are the extreme example),
employment will fall or rise with the physical capital stock. Declining rates
of capital formation will therefore have a long—lasting effect on
unemployment. Unless there is hysteresis in the capital stock itself,
however, this mechanism will not generate hysteresis in unemployment. The
roots may be close to but not, will not be, equal to unity. For practical
purposes it may of course not matter very much whether we have unit roots or
merely roots close to unity, hysteresis or near—hysteresis. If the natural
rate returns to its invariant long—run equilibrium level only very slowly
after it gets perturbed by a movement in the actual rate, the economy will
exhibit near—hysteretic behavior for long periods of time.
To obtain the implications of hysteresis for the existence of an
unemployment—inflation trade—off, we must consider the remainder of the
wage—price mechanism. I will short—cut most of this mechanism and consider
the simple augmented price Phillips curve given in (50). P is the logarithm
of the price level, ir the augmentation term.
—
(50) P1= —$(u —u)+ +1 8 > 0
Equations (48) and (50) imply that
(51a) u = + (1_a)3'(1r —AP)
(51b) u =u1s(AP — + a8'(P —— 27—
Itshould be noted that, hysteresis or not, the old debate about
the presence and nature of nominal inertia or stickiness in wage and price
formation and about the backward—looking or forward—looking nature of the
augmentation term w is still relevant if we are to evaluate policy options
(see e.g. Taylor [1980], Buiter and Jewitt [1981] and Buiter and Miller
[1985]). In other words, equation (48) tells us that, depending on the
behavior of the actual unemployment rate, the natural rate can assumeany
value. The remainder of the wage—price mechanism (i.e. equations such as
(50) and (51a) or (52b)) determines whether actual unemployment (Or real
demand) can be influenced systematically through policy or only through
policy surprises. Blanchard and Summers [19851, perhaps surprisingly,
choose what translates into a "surprise supply function" specification
of w1, i.e. in their model.
(52a) 11t+l =E(P+i
—
isthe expectation operator conditional on information in period t
If only unanticipated inflation can drive a wedge between the natural
and the actual rate, the natural rate becomes a random walk, since
—= E(P)—Pwhich is white noise when expectations are
rational. The change in the actual unemployment rate will be an MAIprocess.
With (52a), only unanticipated expansionary (contractionary) shocks can lower
(increase) the natural rate. Bad luck (OPEC) or bad management (unexpected
contractionary fiscal or monetary policy) caused the rise in unemployment
since the late seventies. Only good luck or expansionary policy surprises
will get it back down.
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical foundations of the
"surprise supply function" are terribly robust, however. With some
inertia in the inflation process, anticipated, systematic policy too
can drive the natural and actual unemployment rate to more desirable— 28—
levels.Buiter and Miller [1985] consider the familiar partly
backward—looking adaptive process for core inflation ii,givenin (52b).
(52b) = + (1—1)EP+i ° ￿ 'VS 1.




Systematic policy keeping expected (and actual) inflation ahead of
core inflation will lower the natural rate. With rational expectations and
any constant rate of inflation, actual unemployment will, in the long run,
equal the natural rate. The "long run" Phillips curve is vertical but it can
be located at any unemployment rate. Similar results can be derived using
staggered, overlapping nominal contracting models as in Taylor [1980], Buiter
and Jewitt [1981] or Buiter and Miller [1985]. Nominal inertia of the kind
considered by McCallum (1977, 1980] does not permit systematic policy to
influence the mean level of unemployment or real demand.
With hysteresis, the case for a boost to demand in current economic
conditions is irrestible. With core inflation given by (51b) and y >0,the
sacrifice ratio is infinite; i.e. the cumulative undiscounted unemployment
cost of achieving a 1 percentage point sustained and sustainable reduction in
the rate of inflation is infinite. That also means that the permanent
inflation cost of achieving any lasting reduction in unemployment is zero. In
the "surprise supply function" case, we can only hope that the authorities
will succeed in surprising us. Even in economies that are merely near—
hysteretic, the case for expansionary demand policy is overwhelming. We would
be as far removed as we could possibly be from the prevailing Euro—pessimist
perception that the supply side constrains everything.
I believe that the case for the existence of a high degree of
hysteresis in Europe is strong enough and that the European
unemployment situation is desperate enough for us to "have a go" at a
significant (supply—side—friendly) hoost to aggregate demand. The risk— 29—
existsthat the situation has been diagnosed wrongly, but it is dwarfed by the
cost of not seizing the opportunity that may be there.
4. Conclusion
Unemployment in Europe is very high and shows no signs of coming down
significantly in the next few years. Under current policies the growth of
real demand is barely sufficient to keep pace with the trend growth rate of
productive potential, leaving the existing reservoir of unused and
underutilized labor power untouched. Three kinds of responses to this
situation are possible. The first response (or non—response) is to accept the
situation, if not as a God—given punishment for our past sins, in any case as
beyond the scope of the existing policy instruments and/or beyond the existing
capacities and institutions for formulating and implementing policy. This, by
revealed preference, seems to be the approach of many European governments,
including those of the U.K., the B.R.D., France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The second response blames policy—induced "supply—side" failures for
—
muchof the deterioration of the employment situation and recommends
"supply—side" measures to remedy the situation. Among the past policy
measures that are in the dock are the following: so—called employment
protection policies that raise the cost of hiring and firing; policies
providing rights, privileges and immunities for organized labor; minimum
wage laws; laws and regulations limiting relative wage flexibility; laws and
regulations limiting regional, occupational and industrial mobility of
labor; taxes that raise the non—wage component of marginal labor costs, such
as employers' social security contributions; high marginal income tax rates
on wage income; high marginal benefit rates for the unemployed and lax
administration of eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits and
medical disability payments. Growth of the public sector in any of its
dimensions ("exhaustive" public spending, employment, total spending, total
revenue, scope of regulatory interventions in the market sector, public
sector production of marketable commodities etc.) is viewed as synonymous
with waste and inefficiency. In the short run such expansion of public
sector activity may appear to improve the employment picture (in terms of a
simple "body count"), but ultimately the "reat"—jobs that finance and-30-
sustain these unproductive public sector activities will suffer, the
Itwealth_creatingI sector will shrink and with it, in due course, the public
sector activities and employment it can no longer support.
Large public sector deficits, probably causally connected with the
growing scope of public sector activities (because of a tendency for the
political mechanism to try and avoid paying with current taxes for current
outlays) are either monetized, causing high inflation, or financed by
borrowing, thus crowding out interest-sensitive private spending. Both the
inflation tax and borrowing are viewed as inimical to private capital
formation, which further weakens the supply side.
This explanation is at best incomplete and exaggerated and at worst
simply wrong. While many intelligent "supply-side" measures can be
implemented to improve both efficiency and equity in the European economies, a
good case can be made that adverse policy-induced supply-side developments did
not cause the bulk of the deterioration of the European employment
performance, and that "supply-side" measures will not be sufficient even or
necessary, it the hysteresis view is valid, for removing most of the existing
labor slack.
Most of the increase in European unemployment since the mid-Seventies
can reasonably be attributed to the two massive adverse supply shocks of OPEC
I and II and to the deliberate global demand deflation, never reversed in
Europe, of the early Eighties. With the recent decline in the real price of
oil and related energy products, the adverse supply shocks are being reversed.
It will take years for this to take its full effect, however, because the
scrapping of productive capacity and low rates of capital formation following
OPEC I and II have resulted in a secularly low path of the physical capital
stock.
In view of this, consider the following policy experiment: a
significant, supply-side-friendly, co-ordinated expansion of aggregate demand
through monetary and fiscal stimuli. Both the efficiency wage view and the
Blanchard-Summers version of the insider-outsider model suggest that an
expansion of demand can result in a sustainable increase in employment and
production without significant upward pressure on real wages. The
near—hysteretic behavior of the unemployment rate in Europe also suggest that
any adverse inflationary consequences of a demand stimulus will be— 31—
temporary,while the output andemploymenteffects will be lasting. The
parallel with the rapid, non-inflationary recovery of employment andoutput
in Britain and otherEuropean countries in the late Thirties, under the
impetusof rearmament spending, comes to mind.
Even if it were agreed that a boost to demand could solvemany of the
European problems, it wouldnt follow automatically that the authoritiescan
actually engineer such a stimulus.' I will consider briefly thefollowing
obstacles to expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. As regardsmonetary
policy, first the absence of nominal inertia and second the threat of
inflation. As regards fiscal policy the threats of financialcrowding out
and of government insolvency. As regards both, the threats of adverse
exchange rate or current account consequences. The issue of government
credibility will be seen to be central in determining the ability of the
government to stimulate aggregate demand. In what follows I shall
concentrate on anticipated or perceived government policy since,except in
the hysteresis-cum-"surprise"-supply_functjon view of the world (given in
equations (48), (50) and (52a)), unanticipated or unperceived policy actions
are unlikely to be welfare-increasing, even ifthey were feasible in a
systematic manner.
As stated in section 2, the effectiveness of anticipated or perceived
policy requires either superior public sector information or a public sector
opportunity set that is superior to the private sectors opportunity set in
at least one dimension. While some of those responsible for the design and
implementation of economic policy may have a (temporary) information
advantage over at least some private sector agents, e.g. as regards the
behavior of the monetary aggregates, international reserves and -most
importantly -asregards the future intentions of the policy authorities, it
would seem unwise to base the case for stabilization policy on that slim
foundation. Pace Fischers "benevolent dissembling government" (Fischer
[1980] it is hard to see how in practice a government could do better as a
rule than by devulging both its priviliged information and its future
intentions.'
The existence of a public sector opportunity set which in some ways
dominates that of the private sector is very plausible indeed. The proximate
reason for stabilization policy effectiveness is the government's superior
access to the capital markets. Government 's can borrow on terms not— 32—
generallyavailable to private agents (at any rate in the main industrial
countries). This is reflected both in lower required rates of return on
government debt compared with private debt of the same maturity, currency
denomination etc., and in the ability of governments to continue borrowing
when private agents encounter credit rationing. The fundamental reason for
this public sector financial clout is that the government's collateral
consists of the maximal stream of current and future resources it can
appropriatethrough taxation andseigniorage. (The binding constraints that
definethe maximum tax revenue are likely to be political rather than
narrowly economic or administrative in character.) The government's monopoly
ofthe power to exact legitimate unrequited transfers of purchasing power
both at a point in time and overtime may also account for the private
sector'swillingness to hold non-interest-bearing nominal government debt
(high-powered money). In addition, restrictions on what constitutes legal
tender and reserve requirements may generate a private sector demand for
base money. The absence of perfect private sector substitutes for base
money, for whatever reasons, creates the tax base for the seigniorage tax.
The asymmetry between public and private opportunity sets in financial
markets is sometimes formalized by attributing finite horizons (in OLG
models without operative intergenerational gift and bequest motives) or
uncertain lifetimes to households, while governments are treated as having
effectively infinite lifetimes. Note that it is not the lifetime of
individual administrations that matters here, but the lifetime of the
institution of government. •More precisely what matters is that successive
governments are expected to assume the debt they inherit from their
predecessors or, as in the case of balanced-budget intergenerational
redistributions, that they are expected to implement the schemes initiated
by their predecessors. The implication is that debt neutrality is absent:
given the exhaustive spending program, the substitution of current borrowing
for current lump-sum taxes by a solvent government will not leave the path
of private consumption unchanged. The substitution of seigniorage revenue
for either explicit lump-sum taxes or borrowing will also in general have
real effects. Given these basic considerations, I now turn to the main
instruments of stabilization policy.
As a revenue raiser, seigniorage is now of very limited actual and
potential importance in most industrial countries.' For monetary policy to— 33—
bean effective stabilisation instrument, other channels of influence must
therefore be present.
Ignoring as empirically unimportant the ability of the authorities to
influence the inflation rate and through it the real interest rate (via the
Tobin effect) even in an economy with flexible money wages and prices, and
ignoring for the same reason the ability of systematic monetary feedback
rules to influence the variance of real output and employment (even in flex-
price "surprise" supply models (see section 2 of this paper and Buiter
[1981]), monetary policy can only be an effective instrument for aggregate
demand management if there is some form of nominal inertia or stickiness:
money wages and/or prices must be predetermined.'' Recent empirical evidence
suggesting that the degree of nominal inertia is low in Europe (in contrast
to the USA) (see e.g. Bruno and Sachs [1985]) would therefore put into
question the ability of monetary policy in Europe to be an important
instrument of demand expansion. The empirical evidence on this issue is,
however by no means clear-cut", and as long as there is some nominal
inertia, monetary policy can play a supporting role in a co-ordinated
expansion of demand.
The monetary expansion required for a demand stimulus is of the nature
of a once-off increase in the level of the path of the nominal money stock,
not a sustained increase in the rate of growth of the nominal money stock.
In due course such a level shift will only raise the level of the price path
without any long-run effect on the inflation rate. In "real time" the
process of moving from a lower to a higher price level path will in practice
involve a temporary increase in the inflation rate.'3 With imperfect
information, non-rational expectations or mechnical indexation procedures,
this temporary increase in the inflation rate may trigger a wage-price
spiral that will prolong the bout of higher inflation. Provided the money
stock is not permitted to respond endogenously to this further inflationary
twist, the process will be damped and the long-run rate of inflation will
not be affected.
Convincing the private players in the labor markets, the product
markets and the financial markets that the increase in the money stock they
are witnessing is a once-off level shift rather than the first step in a
repeated process of ever increasing monetary injections, requires a credible— 34—
government'3.i.e. a government with a strDng, proven record, of anti-
inflationary, preferences andactions.The three conservative administrations
in London, Bonn and Paris have such credibility as does the Japanese and, to
a lesser extent, the U.S. government. For most of the important players, the
desirable monetary policy is actually likely to be time-consistent.
Even absent debt neutrality, fiscal policy may fail to stimulate
aggregate demand because of complete financial crowding out. A variable
velocity of circulation of money and/or accommodating monetary policy will
prevent full crowding-out (in the presence of idle real resources) unless
current fiscal expansion creates expectations of continued future expansion
leading to an ever-increasing debt burden and, ultimately, the threat of de
jure or de facto partial or complete repudiation of the public debt. Again
the credibility of the temporary nature of the fiscal stimulus and the
limited increase in the debt-GDP ratio it entails is crucial for the success
of expansionary fiscal measures. If the financial markets panic, complete
crowding out is likely.1"
The current conservative adminstrations in the larger OECD countries
(with the exception of Italy) are uniquely well-placed to provide a credible
temporary fiscal stimulus. Their reputations for fiscal prudence again make
the right policy time-consistent. Table 1 gives the general government
financial balances for some of the OECD countries.
Table 1
General Government Financial Deficit as a Percentage of Nominal GNP/GDP
198k 1985 1986a
USA 2.7 3.4 3.4
Japan 2.2 1.4 1.5
Germany 1.9 1.1 1.0
France 2.9 2.6 2.9
UK 3.9 2.6 3.1
Italy 13.0 14.0 12.5
TotalOECD 3.4 3.5 3.4
Source:OECD Economic Outlook, Dec. 1986,Table4.
—- ,'I—r,1 ...... i-.. w— 35—
Combinedwith the public debt figures of Table 2, these figuressuggest
that, with the exception of Italy, the debt-deficit situation in the major
European countries is well under control. Even the much-maligned U.S.
budgetary deficit is much less dramatic than has been suggested. With the
U.S. (Federal) public debt at 42 percent of GNP and a modest seven percent
growth of nominal GNP, the public sector deficit could be almost 3percent
of GNP without this adding to the debt-CNP ratio. The actual U.S. general
government deficit of 3.4percentof GNP in 1986 is only slightly higher
than the deficit that would stabilize the debt-GNP ratio. A U.S. fiscal
correction is required in due course, but there is no need to be panicked
into one right now.
A fiscal stimulus in an economy with idle resources need not crowd out
private investment even if interest rates rise. The positive response of
investment to the higher future profits stream permitted by higher demand
will mitigate and may even overcome the negative effect of higher interest
rates. Such a positive response is even more likely if the composition of
the fiscal stiuinulus is investment- and supply-side-friendly.— 36—
Table2
Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP/GNP
1974/801981 1982 1983 198k 1985 1986
USA** 26.0 29.4 33.5 34.9 37.8 41.5
56.6 51.1 57.8 57.5 59.2 57.8 59.0
Italy 67.7 70.2 76.6 84.3 91.1 99.5 103.1
France 25.4 26.0 29.1 30.7 32.9 35.2 36.9
Germany27.7 36.4 39.5 41.0 41.9 42.5 41.6
EUR12 45.0 49.8 53.5 56.0 58.9 60.3
Source:Europe: European Economy, Annual Economic Report 1986-87; no. 30,
nov. 1986 (Debt/GDP); USA: Economic Report of the President, 1987
(Debt/GNP).
* :European Commission Estimate.
** :Gross Federal Debt held by the Public/GNP.
General Government Gross debt at market values.
This implies such actions as temporary investment tax credits and temporary
investment subsidies. Reductions in marginal payroll tax rates should also
be part of the package as would be increases in public sector investment in
Europe's crumbling infrastructure. The stimulus should be modulated across
countries to take account of their differing budgetary and debt conditions.
On average for Europe, a modest proposal would be a three or four year boost
equal to 2 percent of GD? per year, with sufficient monetary accomodation to
prevent a significant increase in short nominal interest rates or an
appreciation of the Ecu against the U.S. Dollar and the Yen.
In an open economy with a fixed exchange rate, part of any expansion of
demand will "leak" abroad through increased demand for imports. With a
floating exchange rate and a high degree of capital mobility, a fiscal
expansion will be partly or even completely crowded out by an appreciation
of the currency. Even if an accommodating monetary policy succeeds in— 37—
keepingthe nominal exchange rate constant, theproblem ofa worsening
current account still exists. This calls for a co-ordinatedexpansion,
involving at least the major European economies and preferably alsoJapan.
The U.S. should ensure that any attempt to restore its fiscalequiljbrj
doesnot lead to a recession (see e.g. Blanchard, Dornbusch andLayard
[1986]).This would be an interesting first challenge for the newChairman
of the Federal Reserve Board.
With a modicum of common sense andabit of luck this kind of co-
ordinated, supply-side-friendly, temporary expansion, differentiatedby
country according to its internal andexternalcircumstances will contribute
to the resolution of the European unemployment problem andtherestoration
of its prosperity. Under present circumstances, "two-handed" rulesout
"tight—fisted".— 38—
Notes
I include in this the quasi-competitive fix-price analysis of Barro and
Grossmann (1971), Malinvaud [1977) and the French School. The occasional
replacement of competitive agents by a conventional monopolist also does
not represent a great gain in insight.
Any one of the four additional bits of information with suffice.
Bubble solutions are ruled out and
I<1.
Since Barros model does not exhibit superneutrality of money, even
different constant and known proportional rates of growth of money will
alter both the actual and the full information equilibrium. Models with
"surprise" supply functions wont have this property.
• c could be a function of N.
•It is noteworthy, that a demand stimulus from abroad (or froma boomin
private domestic capital formation) is often welcomed (or even sought) by
some of the most ardent opponents of a public sector-led expansion of
demand: the source of the demand stimulus determines its desirability.
'Notethat in the "thousand islands"literature,the private sector is
assumed to possess local information (P(z)) that the authorities do not
possess. It is clearly realistic to assume that private agents have
superior firm-specific information.
'Distortionarytaxes willintroduce a further reason for absence of debt
neutrality.
'Notethat seigniorage is defined as ,whereH is the high-powered money
stock. Unanticipated changes in the price level will of course reduce the
realvalue of the governments nominally denominated debt and thus
provide another source of revenue.
10McCallum[1977, 1980] shows that while this is necessary, it is not
sufficient for policy effectiveness.
The theoreticalfoundations of nominal stickiness are fortunately
virtuallynon-existent.
12Witha flexible price level, there could be a once-off discrete jump in
the price level path.
The central bank is, for our purposes, part of the government.
'Foramore extended discussion see Buiter [1985).— 39—
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